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The Distinction Between Civil and Criminal
Contempt in North Carolina
Over the years, attempts to distinguish between civil and criminal contempt
have resulted in a legal morass, perplexing lawyers, judges, and commentators.
North Carolina courts traditionally have based the distinction on the purpose of
the sanction. The contempt is classified as criminal when its purpose is to pre-
serve the court's authority and punish disobedience of court orders, while sanc-
tions for civil contempt are imposed to coerce compliance with an order and
thus provide a remedy for an injured party.1 This "purpose" test leads to confu-
sion, however, because the categories inevitably overlap: often the same con-
temptuous act offends the authority of the court and causes injury to a party.2
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is important because crimi-
nal contempt cannot be imposed on a party who has not been afforded the proce-
dural and evidentiary safeguards mandated for criminal defendants by the
United States Constitution. 3
In Bishop v. Bishop4 the North Carolina Court of Appeals modified the
"purpose" test to create a bright-line rule that distinguishes between civil and
criminal contempt based on the type of relief ordered by the court. 5 When a
contempt proceeding results in a definite prison sentence or a fine payable to the
court, the purpose is punitive and thus constitutes criminal contempt. When the
contempt order provides a means whereby the defendant can purge the con-
tempt (usually compliance with the original order) and avoid or terminate im-
prisonment, however, the purpose is remedial and thus constitutes civil
contempt. 6 This Note examines the reasons for distinguishing between civil and
criminal contempt and argues that a proper distinction must reflect the due pro-
cess considerations implicit in the distinction itself. The Note concludes that the
Bishop court's approaching the problem exclusively at the definitional level fails
to provide the procedural framework needed to guide trial courts in their treat-
ment of contemptuous behavior.
A 1986 consent judgment required Ronald Lynn Bishop to pay child sup-
port in the amount of $350 per month to Rina Janey Bishop. 7 In August of
1986, when the child support obligation commenced, Mr. Bishop was employed
at a monthly rate of approximately $2000.8 In August and September 1986 Mr.
1. See, eg., O'Briant v. O'Briant, 313 N.C. 432, 434, 329 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1985); Mauney v.
Mauney, 268 N.C. 253, 256, 159 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1966); Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N.C. 120, 123, 84
S.E.2d 822, 825 (1954); Dyer v. Dyer, 213 N.C. 634, 635, 197 S.E. 157, 158 (1938); Blue Jeans Corp.
v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 4 N.C. App. 245, 247-48, 166 S.E.2d 698, 700, aff'd, 275 N.C.
503, 169 S.E.2d 867 (1969).
2. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
3. See Hicks ex rel Feiock v. Feiock, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 1429-30 (1988).
4. 90 N.C. App. 499, 369 S.E.2d 106 (1988).
5. Id. at 503-05, 369 S.E.2d at 108-10.
6. Id. at 505, 369 S.E.2d at 109.
7. Id. at 500, 369 S.E.2d at 106.
8. Id.
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Bishop paid a total of $60, leaving $640 in arrears. 9 The full $350 payment was
paid in October 1986, at which time Mr. Bishop voluntarily resigned from his
job.10 He remained unemployed until March 1987, when he began working at a
rate of $4.25 per hour.11 He made token payments of $30 in April and June
1987.12
On plaintiff's motion, the court ordered defendant to "show cause why he
should not be found in willful contempt."' 3 Defendant appeared at the June
1987 hearing without counsel, and plaintiff called him as her sole witness. 14 De-
fendant admitted that the total arrearage of child support payments was
$2230.15 At the conclusion of the hearing the trial judge issued a written order
stating that "the Defendant has had the ability to pay child support [and] that
his failure to do so is willful contempt." 1 6 Defendant was sentenced to twenty-
nine days in the county jail but was offered the chance to purge himself from
contempt and be released if he paid the entire arrearage of $2,230.17 Defend-
ant's mother paid this amount to the clerk of superior court to avoid defendant's
incarceration. 18
Defendant appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which re-
versed the trial court's contempt decree. 19 Although both parties briefed the
appeal on the assumption that the order was for criminal contempt, the court
noted that the inclusion of a purge clause in the order left it ambiguous whether
the order was for civil contempt, criminal contempt, or both. 20 To make this
determination, the court relied heavily on a recent United States Supreme Court
case, Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock.2t In Hicks the Court held that for purposes
of determining the applicability of federal constitutional protections in state con-
9. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 3, Bishop (No. 8718DC1 140).
10. Id. Plaintiff alleged that defendant deliberately depressed his income by resigning gainful
employment without another job available and subsequently taking a job at 25% of former earnings.
Id. Defendant denied this allegation and pointed out that the judge made no finding of fact that the
resignation was unjustified. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 5.
11. Bishop, 90 N.C. App. at 500, 369 S.E.2d at 106. During his unemployment, the record
reflects that he made full $350 payments in December 1986 and January 1987. Id.
12. Id. Plaintiff calculated that from April to June defendant's gross income was approxi-
mately $2,390. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 3. Defendant testified that his rent during this time was
$150 per month and that he and his companion grew their own food. See id. Thus, defendant's net
income during this period was approximately $1,790 while his child support obligation during the
same period totaled $1,050.
13. Bishop, 90 N.C. App. at 500, 369 S.E.2d at 106.
14. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 3.
15. Bishop, 90 N.C. App. at 500, 369 S.E.2d at 106. Neither the record nor defendant's brief
reflects that defendant knew or was informed that he could not be compelled to testify against him-
self in either criminal or civil contempt proceedings. See infra notes 42-49 and 57-60 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of a defendant's rights in criminal and civil contempt proceedings.
16. Bishop, 90 N.C. App. at 500, 369 S.E.2d at 106-07.
17. Id. at 500-01, 369 S.E.2d at 106-07. The trial judge made no finding that defendant had the
present ability to pay the full amount of this arrearage. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 4-5. Thejudge did order that future child support payments be made to the clerk of superior court and
authorized plaintiff to complete the paperwork to garnish defendant's wages to assist in collection.
Bishop, 90 N.C. App. at 501, 369 S.E.2d at 107.
18. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at app. 2.
19. Bishop, 90 N.C. App. at 507, 369 S.E.2d at 110.
20. Id. at 502, 369 S.E.2d at 107.
21. 108 S. Ct. 1423 (1988).
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tempt proceedings the distinction between civil and criminal contempt should be
based solely on the nature of the relief imposed.22 In accordance with Hicks, the
Bishop court formulated the following straightforward rules to distinguish civil
from criminal contempt:
Civil Relief: If the relief is imprisonment, it is coercive and thus civil if
the contemnor may avoid or terminate his imprisonment by perform-
ing some act required by the court (such as agreeing to comply with
the original order). If the relief is monetary, it is likewise civil if the
monies are either paid to the complainant or defendant can avoid pay-
ment to the court by performing an act required by the court.
Criminal Relief: If the relief is imprisonment, it is punitive and thus
criminal if the sentence is limited to a definite period of time without
possibility of avoidance by the contemnor's performance of an act re-
quired by the court. If the relief is monetary, it is punitive if payable to
the court rather than to the complainant. 23
The court commented that this "objective focus" on the nature of the relief or-
dered "allows the proper balance between the court's inherent power to protect
its authority and the defendant's need for adequate procedural and evidentiary
standards and effective appellate review." 24
Returning to the facts of the case, the court determined that the trial
judge's order was for civil contempt because it included a purge clause allowing
defendant to avoid imprisonment if he paid the total arrearages. 25 By statute in
North Carolina, every order for civil contempt must include a specific finding of
22. Id. at 1429-30. In Hicks defendant was charged with nine counts of failure to make
monthly child support payments. Id. at 1427. The District Attorney, prosecuting the case on behalf
of plaintiff, invoked a California statute that imposes a mandatory presumption of ability to pay on
defendants in contempt proceedings for nonpayment of child support obligations. Id. at 1427-28; see
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1209.5 (West 1982). Defendant was unable to overcome this presumption
and was found in contempt on five of the nine counts. Hicks, 108 S. Ct. at 1427. He was sentenced
to 25 days in jail, but the sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on informal probation
on the condition that he make monthly support payments of $150 and an additional payment of $50
per month on the arrearage. Id.
Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, which reversed his
conviction. Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 180 Cal. App. 3d 649, 225 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1986), vacated,
108 S. Ct. 1423 (1988). The court determined that the contempt proceeding was "quasi-criminal" as
a matter of state law and ruled that the statute employed at the contempt proceeding unconstitution-
ally shifted the burden of proof on an element of a criminal offense to the defendant. Id. at 654, 225
Cal. Rptr. at 751.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 107 S. Ct. 1367 (1987). Vacating the
judgment of the state court, the Court held that for purposes of determining the applicability of
federal constitutional protections, the characterization of a contempt proceeding as civil or criminal
in nature is a question of federal law. Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 1428 (1988).
According to the Court, the contempt is criminal when the relief imposed is a definite term of
imprisonment or a fine payable to the court, and the contempt is civil when the contemnor can purge
the contempt with the performance of some affirmative act required by the court order. Id. at 1429-
30. Because the trial court did not specify whether payment of the arrearages would purge defend-
ant's determinate prison sentence, the Court remanded the case to the trial court. Id. at 1434.
23. Bishop, 90 N.C. App. at 505, 369 S.E.2d at 109.
24. Id. The court added that when civil and criminal relief are imposed for the same act, the
court must "make all necessary findings for each class of relief and afford the defendant all proce-
dural and evidentiary standards appropriate to criminal contempt proceedings." Id.
25. Id. at 506, 369 S.E.2d at 110.
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fact that defendant had the present ability to comply with the purge clause.26
Because the trial judge's order did not include a finding that defendant had the
present ability to pay the total arrearages, the court reversed the trial court's
adjudication of civil contempt.27
North Carolina's attempts to distinguish between civil and criminal con-
tempt are typical of those of other states.28 In an early case, Dyer v. Dyer,29 the
North Carolina Supreme Court focused on the trial court's purpose for adjudg-
ing the defendant in contempt:
Criminal contempt is a term applied where the judgment is in punish-
ment of an act already accomplished, tending to interfere with the ad-
ministration of justice. Civil contempt is a term applied where the
proceeding is had to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties
to suits and to compel obedience to orders and decrees made for the
benefit of such parties.30
After Dyer, North Carolina courts generally followed this purpose test.31 The
supreme court endorsed the purpose test as recently as 1985, basically restating
the Dyer formulation: "Where the punishment is to preserve the court's author-
ity and to punish disobedience of its orders, it is criminal contempt. Where the
purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured suitor and to coerce compliance
with an order, the contempt is civil."'32
In an attempt "to draw a sharp distinction between proceedings for crimi-
nal contempt and the proceedings for civil contempt, '3 3 the North Carolina
General Assembly in 1978 replaced Chapter 5,34 the statutes dealing with con-
tempt, with Chapter 5A.3 5 Article 1 of the new chapter addresses criminal con-
tempt and offers an exclusive list of ten behaviors that constitute criminal
contempt. 36 The judge as trier of fact must determine that the contemptuous act
26. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 5A-21(a)(3) (1986); see Jones v. Jones, 62 N.C. App. 748, 749, 303
S.E.2d 582, 584 (1983); infra note 52 and accompanying text.
27. Bishop, 90 N.C. App. at 506-07, 369 S.E.2d at 110.
28. See generally 12 AM. JUR. 2D Contempt § 4 (1964) (surveying state courts' attempts to
draw the distinction).
29. 213 N.C. 634, 197 S.E. 157 (1938).
30. Id. at 635, 197 S.E. at 158.
31. See, eg., North Carolina v. Carr, 264 F. Supp. 75, 79 (W.D.N.C.), appeal dismissed, 386
F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1967); Mauney v. Mauney, 268 N.C. 254, 256, 159 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1966); Blue
Jeans Corp. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 4 N.C. App. 245, 247, 166 S.E.2d 698, 700, aff'd,
275 N.C. 503, 169 S.E.2d 867 (1969).
32. O'Briant v. O'Briant, 313 N.C. 432, 434, 329 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1985).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 5, art. 1 official commentary (1986).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5-1 to -9 (repealed 1978).
35. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5A-11 to -25 (1986 & Supp. 1988). The new statutes became
effective July 1, 1978.
The contempt power does not stem from legislative mandate, but rather is recognized as an
inherent judicial power in all North Carolina courts. See Snow v. Hawkes, 183 N.C. 365, 367, 111
S.E. 621, 622 (1922); In re Brown, 168 N.C. 417, 420, 84 S.E. 690, 692 (1915); Ex parte McCown,
139 N.C. 101, 104, 51 S.E. 957, 958-64 (1905). While the legislature may not abrogate these powers,
North Carolina courts have recognized that they may be reasonably regulated. In re Robinson, 117
N.C. 367, 370, 23 S.E. 453, 454 (1895); In re Oldham, 89 N.C. 23, 25 (1883).
36. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-11(a) (1986). The ten behaviors are as follows:
(1) Willful behavior committed during the sitting of a court and directly tending to inter-
rupt its proceedings.
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was done willfully or was preceded by a warning from the court of the impropri-
ety of the act.37 Article 1 divides criminal contempt into two classes: direct and
indirect. A judge may find in direct contempt any person who commits a dis-
ruptive or obstructive act in open court.3 8 All other criminal contempts are
classified as indirect 39 and require a plenary hearing before punishment can be
imposed.4° Plenary proceedings are initiated by an order of the court directing
the person to appear and show cause why he should not be held in criminal
contempt. 4 1 Because criminal contempts are crimes, criminal contempt pro-
ceedings must afford the alleged contemnor all Bill of Rights procedures and due
process protections associated with criminal trials.42 Section 5A-15 provides
that the criminal contemnor must be afforded an unbiased judge,43 a presump-
tion of innocence until guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt,44 a right
(2) Willful behavior committed during the sitting of a court in its immediate view and
presence and directly tending to impair the respect due its authority.
(3) Willful disobedience of, resistance to, or interference with a court's lawful process,
order, directive, or instruction or its execution.
(4) Willful refusal to be sworn or affirmed as a witness, or, when so sworn or affirmed,
willful refusal to answer any legal and proper question when the refusal is not legally
justified.
(5) Willful publication of a report of the proceedings in a court that is grossly inaccurate
and presents a clear and present danger of imminent and serious threat to the administra-
tion of justice, made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false. No person, however, may be punished for publishing a truthful report of
proceedings in a court.
(6) Willful or grossly negligent failure by an officer of the court to perform his duties in
an official transaction.
(7) Willful or grossly negligent failure to comply with schedules and practices of the
court resulting in substantial interference with the business of the court.
(8) Willful refusal to testify or produce other information upon the order of a judge act-
ing pursuant to Article 61 of Chapter 15A, Granting of Immunity to Witnesses.
(9) Willful communication with a juror in an improper attempt to influence his
deliberations.
(10) Any other act or omission specified elsewhere in the General Statutes of North Caro-
lina as grounds for criminal contempt.
Id.
37. Id. § 5A-12(b).
38. Id. § 5A-13(a) (direct contemptuous acts must be committed within the sight or hearing of
a presiding judge and in, or in immediate proximity to, the courtroom when proceedings are being
held); see Billings, Contempt, Order in the Courtroom, Mistrials, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 910
& n.l (1978). When such conduct occurs, the judge summarily may charge and punish the contem-
nor. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-14 (1986). Even though due process protections required in plenary
proceedings need not be provided in summary proceedings, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
determined that summary proceedings are constitutional. In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 76, 152
S.E.2d 317, 323-24, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918 (1967).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-13(b) (1986).
40. Id. The presiding judge may, if he so chooses, offer a plenary hearing for direct criminal
contempts as well. Id. § 5A-13(a).
41. Id. § 5A-15(a) (Supp. 1988). A copy of the order must be provided to the person charged.
Id.
42. See, eg., North Carolina v. Carr, 264 F. Supp. 75, 79 (W.D.N.C.), appeal dismissed, 386
F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1967); O'Briant v. O'Briant, 313 N.C. 432, 435, 329. S.E.2d 370, 373 (1985).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-15(a) (Supp. 1988) ("If the criminal contempt is based upon acts
before a judge which so involve him that his objectivity may reasonably be questioned, the order
must be returned before a different judge.").
44. Id. § 5A-15(e).
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against self-incrimination, 45 notice of the charges against her and an opportunity
to be heard in her own behalf,46 and time to prepare a defense.47 Although not
expressly provided in the statute, judicial decisions make clear that the criminal
contemnor also is entitled to confront witnesses 48 and to be represented by ap-
pointed counsel if indigent. 49 The penalty for criminal contempt may be cen-
sure, imprisonment for up to thirty days, fines not exceeding $500, or any
combination of the three.50
Article 2 of Chapter 5A defines civil contempt as a "[flailure to comply
with an order of a court." 5' The court may continue to hold the defendant in
civil contempt as long as the order remains in force and the defendant is either
currently able to comply with the order or is "able to take reasonable steps that
would enable him to comply with the order."'52 The alleged contemnor's failure
to comply also must be willful. 53 Upon a finding of probable cause, 54 the court
may initiate civil contempt proceedings either by notice or by a court order re-
45. Id.
46. Id. § 5A-15(a).
47. Id. (show cause order must specify a "reasonable time" for alleged contemnor to appear
and defend herself).
In Bloom v. Illinois the United States Supreme Court determined that a jury trial must be
provided to any criminal contemnor when the charge could result in a prison sentence of six months
or more. 391 U.S. 194, 208-10 (1968). Because under North Carolina law the maximum prison
sentence for criminal contempt is 30 days, there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in the state.
See Thompson v. Thompson, 25 N.C. App. 79, 82, 212 S.E.2d 243, 244, appeal dismissed, 288 N.C.
120, 215 S.E.2d 606 (1975).
48. Lowder v. Mills, Inc., 301 N.C. 561, 583, 273 S.E.2d 247, 260 (1981).
49. See, eg., Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136 (1965).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-12(a) (Supp. 1988). Because criminal contempt is a wrong against
the state, all fines must be payable to the state. North Carolina courts cannot award private damages
in a criminal contempt proceeding. See In re Rhodes, 65 N.C. 464, 465 (1871); Glesner v. Dem-
brosky, 73 N.C. App. 594, 599, 327 SE.2d 60, 63 (1985). But see 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contempt § 113
(1964) (majority rule contra).
Appeal from a conviction for criminal contempt imposed by a superior court judge may be
taken in the normal manner provided for appeals in criminal actions. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-17
(1986). When the conviction is imposed by a district court judge, magistrate, or clerk, appeal is to a
superior court judge for a hearing de novo. Id.; see Michael v. Michael, 77 N.C. App. 841, 843, 336
S.E.2d 414, 415 (1985).
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21(a) (1986).
52. Id. Reasonable measures might include liquidating assets, borrowing the money, or taking
an available job. See Teachey v. Teachey, 46 N.C. App. 332, 335, 264 S.E.2d 786, 788-89 (1980)
(reasonable measures would include "borrowing the money, selling defendant's mountain property
in Virginia, or liquidating other assets"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21 official commentary (1986) ("the
person who does not have the money to make court-ordered payments but who could take a job
which would enable him to make those payments, remains in contempt by not taking such a job").
But cf. Self v. Self, 55 N.C. App. 651, 653-54, 286 S.E.2d 579, 581 (1982) (evidence must show not
only the ability to work but also that a job was available to him at the time).
In addition, the contempt continues only as long as the purpose of the order still may be served
by compliance with the order. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21(a)(2) (1986). For example, a witness who
refuses to testify at trial may be found in civil contempt and imprisoned until she agrees to testify.
Her contempt should not continue beyond the end of the trial, however, since compliance would no
longer serve the purpose of the order. See Billings, supra note 38, at 919.
53. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 52 N.C. App. 104, 111, 278 S.E.2d 260, 264 (1981) (element of
willfulness is "retained by implication" in the new contempt statutes).
54. The probable cause may be based on a motion and sworn statement or affidavit of a person
interested in the proceeding and must be given at least five days in advance unless good cause is
shown. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 5A-23(a) (Supp. 1988); see, e.g., M.G. Newell Co. v. Wyrick, 91 N.C.
App. 98, 101, 370 S.E.2d 431, 434 (1988) (good cause shown to waive five-day notice requirement
1286 [Vol. 67
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quiring the alleged contemnor to appear and show cause. 55 The civil contempt
statutes do not require that the due process protections available to criminal
contemnors be incorporated into civil contempt proceedings.5 6 Because impris-
onment is available as a civil remedy, however, courts have extended to the civil
contemnor some due process protections typically associated with criminal pro-
ceedings. A civil contemnor is entitled to the right against self-incrimination,
57
the right to confront witnesses, 58 the time to prepare a defense,5 9 and the ap-
pointment of counsel for indigents when necessary to present the defendant's
case or otherwise to ensure fundamental fairness. 60 A person found in civil con-
tempt may be imprisoned as long as the contempt continues,6 1 but the judge
must specify the action the contemnor can take to purge himself of the con-
tempt.62 Because the civil contemnor must have the present ability to comply
with this purge clause,63 he is said to hold the key to his prison in his pocket. 64
Despite the North Carolina General Assembly's attempt to distinguish be-
tween the two types of contempt, the distinction remained consistently obscured
by subsections 5A-12(d) and 5A-21(c), which indicate that both civil and crimi-
nal contempt can be found for the same conduct.65 Neither subsection suggests
that separate civil and criminal proceedings are necessary for each finding. 66
when defendant knew for months of particular charges against him and had ample time and oppor-
tunity to prepare his defense).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-23(a) (Supp. 1988). The availability of either notice or order to
begin the proceeding is intended to make clear that a finding of civil contempt may be entered in the
alleged contemnor's absence if he fails to appear, unless the court wants the alleged contemnor
physically present so that he may be imprisoned immediately if he is found in contempt. Billings,
supra note 38, at 917.
56. For a discussion of applicable due process protections of criminal contemnors, see supra
notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1975); Allred v. Graves, 261 N.C. 31, 34-
35, 134 S.E.2d 186, 189-90 (1964); Lowder v. Mills, Inc., 45 N.C. App. 348, 355, 263 S.E.2d 624, 628
(1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 301 N.C. 561, 273 S.E.2d 247 (1981).
58. See, e.g., Lowder v. Mills, Inc., 301 N.C. 561, 583, 273 S.E.2d 247, 260 (1981).
59. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-23(a) (Supp. 1988) (requiring at least five days notice for de-
fendant unless good cause is shown); see also M.G. Newell Co. v. Wyrick, 91 N.C. App. 98, 101, 370
S.E.2d 431, 434 (1988) (good cause shown when defendant knew the particular charges against him
for months).
60. See Jolly v. Wright, 300 N.C. 83, 93, 265 S.E.2d 135, 143 (1980); Hodges v. Hodges, 64
N.C. App. 550, 552, 307 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1983). Many states and several federal circuits hold that
an indigent civil contemnor facing imprisonment automatically is entitled to appointed counsel. See,
e.g., Walker v. McClain, 768 F.2d 1181, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1221
(4th Cir. 1973); Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537, 538 (Alaska 1974); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315
N.W.2d 9, 11-14 (Iowa 1982); Tetro v. Tetro, 86 Wash. 2d 252, 254, 544 P.2d 17, 19 (1975);
Brotzman v. Brotzman, 91 Wis. 2d 335, 336, 283 N.W.2d 600, 602 (1979); see also Herrman &
Donahue, Fathers Behind Bars: The Right to Counsel in Civil Contempt Proceedings, 14 N.M.L.
REV. 276, 294 (1984) (arguing that indigents are by definition unable to comply with support orders
but without appointed counsel may not be able to prove this inability).
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21(b) (1986).
62. Id. § 5A-23(e) (Supp. 1988); see Bethea v. McDonald, 70 N.C. App. 566, 570-71, 320
S.E.2d 690, 693 (1984) (an order for civil contempt that does not include a purge clause is defective
and must be reversed on appeal).
63. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
64. See, eg., State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 130, 262 N.W.2d 80, 83 (1978).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5A-12(d), 5A-21(c) (1986).
66. See, e.g., M.G. Newell Co. v. Wyrick, 91 N.C. App. 98, 99-100, 370 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1988)
(finding defendant in both civil and criminal contempt for the same conduct at a single hearing).
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Therefore, despite the new statute's deliniations, it remained impossible to deter-
mine whether the contempt was civil or criminal. That the contempt was found
at civil proceedings or criminal proceedings offered no guidance on this issue, for
criminal contempt could be found during the course of civil contempt proceed-
ings, and vice versa.67 Nevertheless, the court of appeals began to draw the dis-
tinction based on the statutory differences between the two types of contempt,
including the nature of the procedures used in the proceeding, 68 the nature of
the sanction imposed, 69 and the nature of the order commencing the proceed-
ings.7 0 In some cases the appellate court offered no reason at all for classifying
the contempt as civil, presumably relying exclusively on the intent of the parties
and the trial court.7 1
The various efforts at classifying civil and criminal contempt tend to ob-
scure the purpose for drawing the distinction. The court in Bishop noted that
"the purpose of the [criminal/civil] classification is simply to say that criminal
type sentences should not be meted out where criminal type protections are not
afforded and that coercive sentences shall not be meted out where there is noth-
ing to coerce." 72 To achieve this purpose, a proper distinction must incorporate
the due process rights required for the criminal contempt defendant.
The purpose test as formulated in Dyer and O'Briant v. O'Briant73 fails to
encapsulate these due process considerations because punitive and coercive pur-
poses overlap significantly in most contempt orders. Although one purpose of
imprisoning a contemnor until he complies with the court order may be to co-
erce compliance with that order, the term of imprisonment also has the effect of
punishing the contemnor for failure to comply with the order before contempt
proceedings became necessary. Likewise, although the obvious purpose of im-
prisoning a contemnor for a definite term is punitive, the intended effect of the
punishment is to coerce the contemnor to modify his behavior in the future. The
coercive purpose for the prison sentence, however, does not change the fact that
the sanction is criminal and the contemnor must be afforded due process protec-
tions before the sanction may be imposed.74
Rather than attempting to ascertain the trial court's remedial or punitive
67. Id. at 100, 370 S.E.2d at 434 (finding the defendant in criminal contempt at a civil contempt
proceeding).
68. Bethea v. McDonald, 70 N.C. App. 566, 567, 320 S.E.2d 690, 691 (1984) (the court as-
sumed that the contempt order was for civil contempt because it was determined in a civil
proceeding).
69. See Bennett v. Bennett, 71 N.C. App. 424, 427, 322 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1984) ("The Court did
not say whether it found the defendant in civil or criminal contempt. It punished the defendant as if
he was in civil contempt.").
70. See, eg., Mather v. Mather, 70 N.C. App. 106, 108-09, 318 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1984) (court
assumed that a proceeding initiated by a motion alleging criminal contempt was for criminal
contempt).
71. See, eg., Frank v. Glanville, 45 N.C. App. 313, 314-16, 262 S.E.2d 677, 679 (1980).
72. Bishop, 90 N.C. App. 499, 503, 369 S.E.2d 106, 108 (1988) (quoting DOBBs, LAW OF REM-
EDIES § 2.9, at 97 (1973)).
73. See Dyer, 213 N.C. 634, 197 S.E. 157; O'Briant v. O'Briant, 313 N.C. 432, 329 S.E.2d 370
(1985). For a discussion of the purpose test, see supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
74. See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 1431-32 (1988); Gompers v. Buck Stove
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 443 (1911).
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motivations, the court in Bishop offered a bright-line rule: ;when the sanction is
punitive the contempt is criminal, and, conversely, when the sanction is coercive
the contempt is civil. 75 Unfortunately this bright line distinction does not reflect
the relevant due process considerations any better than did the old purpose test.
To classify an act as criminal contempt because criminal sanctions are imposed
states a mere tautology.76 Under this reasoning, the due process protections
that must be afforded the defendant at the contempt proceedings depend on
what type of sanction the trial court imposes. 77 Because the North Carolina
contempt statutes allow the judge to find criminal contempt in civil contempt
proceedings, 78 and, likewise, civil contempt in criminal contempt proceedings, 79
the type of sanction to be imposed cannot be determined until the conclusion of
the proceedings. At the conclusion of the proceedings, however, it is obviously
too late to adjust the procedures to fit the sanction imposed. 80 Thus, the Bishop
bright-line rule neither informs the trial court what procedures should be em-
ployed during the proceedings nor guarantees that criminal sanctions will be
imposed only when criminal due process protections have been afforded.
The court in Bishop apparently failed to recognize the nature of the problem
confronting it. The purpose of the civil/criminal distinction is to make certain
that "criminal type sentences" are imposed only when "criminal type protec-
tions" are afforded to the alleged contemnor during the proceedings. 81 The so-
lution, then, is to develop a procedural scheme to guide the trial court's
treatment of contempt that ensures this purpose will be achieved. The Bishop
court, which approached the problem exclusively at the definitional level, offers
no such scheme.8 2
One solution to the problem, adopted in Wisconsin, is to limit the availabil-
ity of criminal sanctions to contempt proceedings using criminal procedures.
83
In civil proceedings the court can impose only coercive sanctions. With this
approach the character of the sanction imposed becomes irrelevant because the
civil/criminal distinction turns on the need for procedural safeguards. 84 Ac-
cordingly, at a criminal contempt proceeding the court may impose either coer-
cive or punitive relief.
Despite the practicality of the Wisconsin approach, the North Carolina
General Assembly did not adopt this procedural arrangement when it enacted
subsection 5A-23(g), which states:
75. Bishop, 90 N.C. App. at 505, 369 S.E.2d at 109.
76. See Note, Contempt of Court: Some Considerations for Reform, 1975 WIs. L. REV. 1117,
1121 (1985).
77. See Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal
Contempt, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 677, 684 (1981).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-23(g) (Supp. 1988).
79. Id. § 5A-12(d).
80. See Martineau, supra note 77, at 684.
81. Bishop, 90 N.C. App. at 503, 369 S.E.2d at 108.
82. See Note, supra note 76, at 1130 ("An approach purely at the definitional level is like a
knife cutting water; it could only add to the confusion already prevalent in the law of contempt.").
83. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 785.01 to -.03 (West 1988); see also Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A
Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 246 (1971) (recommending such an arrangement).
84. See Note, supra note 76, at 1131 n.94.
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A judge conducting a hearing to determine if a person is in civil con-
tempt may at that hearing, upon making the required findings, find the
person in criminal contempt for the same conduct, regardless of
whether imprisonment for civil contempt is proper in the case.85
As the Official Commentary following this subsection explains, the statute al-
lows a judge who has "begun a civil contempt hearing to continue and find the
[defendant] in criminal contempt" if the facts support such a conclusion.8 6 The
judge may wait until the conclusion of the evidence before electing to impose
civil or criminal sanctions, or both. This flexibility is particularly useful in civil
nonsupport cases such as Bishop. Although the dominant purpose of such pro-
ceedings is to coerce compliance with the support order, the evidence sometimes
indicates that the defendant has deliberately pauperized himself to avoid the
support obligation.8 7 In these instances the defendant does not have the present
ability to pay and thus cannot be held in civil contempt.88 Because the defend-
ant had the ability to pay the support payments when ordered by the court and
willfully failed to do so, however, the evidence does establish criminal con-
tempt.8 9 Subsection 5A-23(g) permits the judge to impose a criminal sanction in
this situation without the need for a separate criminal proceeding on the same
issue.90
The problem with the North Carolina approach is that it allows the trial
court to impose criminal sanctions without affording the defendant criminal
constitutional safeguards. The apparent solution, recommended by several com-
mentators, is to insist that the trial court apply the due process protections re-
quired in criminal contempt proceedings in any civil proceeding that may result
in criminal sanctions.9' Although this solution would resolve the due process
problem, it is inequitable for other reasons. If criminal procedures were used in
contempt proceedings for nonsupport, the plaintiff necessarily would have to
bear the burdens of production and persuasion on every issue.92 Moreover, the
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-23(g) (1986).
86. Id. § 5A-23 official commentary (1986) (emphasis added).
87. See, eg., Faught v. Faught, 67 N.C. App. 37, 46, 312 S.E.2d 504, 509, disc. rev. denied, 311
N.C. 304, 317 S.E.2d 680 (1984); Williford v. Williford, 56 N.C. App. 610, 612, 289 S.E.2d 907, 909
(1982).
A similar situation arises when the defendant consistently pays the arrearage on the day before
the contempt hearing. Because no support obligation remains to be coerced, the court cannot find
the defendant in civil contempt. Because he willfully failed to comply with the obligation when it
became due, however, a finding of criminal contempt would be appropriate. See, e.g., Hudson v.
Hudson, 31 N.C. App. 547, 551, 230 S.E.2d 188, 188-89 (1976) (payment between filing date and
the hearing).
88. See, eg., Fought, 67 N.C. App. at 46, 312 S.E.2d at 509.
89. Id.
90. See, eg., M.G. Newell Co. v. Wyrick, 91 N.C. App. 98, 100, 370 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1988)
(finding the defendant in criminal contempt at a purely civil contempt proceeding).
91. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 83, at 246; Ennis & Mason, The Use of Contempt to Enforce
Child-Support Orders in North Carolina 17, SPECIAL SERIES-UNIVERSITY OF N.C. INST. OF GOV'T
(1986).
92. In criminal cases, the burdens of production and persuasion cannot be shifted to the defend-
ant on any element of the offense because to do so would undercut the prosecution's burden to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 167 (1979);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-02 (1975).
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plaintiff would have to prove each issue beyond a reasonable doubt rather than
by the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable in civil cases. As Jus-
tice O'Connor forcefully argued in her dissent in Hicks, such an arrangement
would turn a support order into "a worthless scrap of paper."
Contempt proceedings will often be useless if the parent seeking en-
forcement of valid support orders must prove that the obligor can
comply with the court order. The custodial parent will typically lack
access to the financial and employment records needed to sustain the
burden imposed. . . , especially where the noncustodial parent is self-
employed. 93
By contrast, when civil procedures are erhployed in civil contempt proceedings,
the defendant bears the initial burden to come forward with some explanation
for his nonpayment. 94 In Plott v. Plott95 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held that defendants also bear the ultimate burden of proof on the issues of
inability to pay and willfulness. 96
The Bishop case offered the court of appeals an ideal opportunity to develop
procedures to lead trial courts in their attempts to provide defendants with the
necessary due process protections while at the same time maintaining an efficient
mechanism to enforce their support orders. Because the court failed to offer a
solution, the general assembly should consider legislative action. One possible
solution would be to bifurcate the nonsupport contempt proceeding into sepa-
rate civil and criminal stages. The proceeding would begin by using civil proce-
dures and progress to a determination whether a finding of civil contempt is
appropriate. If in the opinion of the court the facts merited a consideration of
criminal contempt then the proceeding would continue, thereafter using crimi-
nal procedures to afford the alleged contemnor full constitutional safeguards. 97
The details of such a proposal would have to be resolved before a critical analy-
sis of its merits seriously could be undertaken.9s The Bishop bright-line rule, by
contrast, simplifies the civil/criminal distinction for the appellate courts and ap-
93. Hicks ex rel Feiock v. Feiock, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 1436 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For
a discussion of Hicks, see supra note 22.
94. See Ennis & Mason, supra note 91, at 14-15; Note, The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt,
33 U. CHx. L. REV. 120, 131 (1965).
95. 74 N.C. App. 82, 327 S.E.2d 273 (1985).
96. Id. at 84, 327 S.E.2d at 274. "The statutes governing proceedings for civil contempt in
child support cases clearly assign the burden of proof to the party alleged to be delinquent." Id. at
85-86, 327 S.E.2d at 275. This case may be misleading, however, for defendant offered no explana-
tion for his failure to comply with the order. Whether the defendant must carry the burden of proof
in the more typical situation in which the defendant offers some excuse and both sides contest its
merits remains uncertain. See Ennis & Mason, supra note 91, at 13-17 (detailed discussion of the
burdens of producing evidence and proof in civil contempt cases).
97. An obvious difficulty with this suggestion is the possibility that in attempting to defeat the
civil contempt charge the defendant might offer evidence which would incriminate him later in the
criminal stage of the proceeding. As noted at supra text accompanying note 57, however, the alleged
contemnor may invoke the right against self-incrimination in a civil proceeding just as he can in a
criminal proceeding. Nevertheless, the bifurcation well might increase the complexity of the legal
issues involved and therefore require the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in civil
proceedings more often than was previously thought necessary. See supra note 60 and accompanying
text.
98. One such detail will be the extent to which the parties will be precluded from relitigating in
the criminal phase issues already decided in the civil phase.
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pellate advocates, but fails to provide trial courts with the guidance essential to a
satisfactory treatment of contemptuous behavior.
W. GREGORY RHODES
